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Abstract 
We argue that intergenerational neutrality has been prematurely excluded from the dialogue 
on sustainable growth. By incorporating Burton’s distinction between intragenerational and 
intergenerational discounting into a model suitable for analyzing sustainability issues, we 
are able to accommodate some of the underlying concerns. We show that in an economy 
with a renewable resource, eschewing intergenerational discounting leads to the implication 
of a sustained growth path, without the necessity of a sustainability constraint. We find that 
green net national product remains constant along the optimal approach path to golden rule 
consumption. This avoids the paradox that maximizing sustainable income leads to 
unsustained consumption and income.  
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IMPATIENCE AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN A MODEL OF 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
 





  Neoclassical theory of sustainable growth has required a positive utility discount rate. 
This is odd because sustainability has everything to do with intergenerational equity (see e.g. 
Solow, 1993). Moreover, intergenerational equity is often interpreted as requiring a zero rate of 
pure time preference. Ramsey (1928) is often cited for his forceful pronouncement that 
discounting is “ethically indefensible”.  Rawls (1971) explicitly rejected applying his maxi-min 
principle to intergenerational equity, and Solow has opined from a Rawlsian impartial spectator 
perspective (“in solemn conclaves assembled,” Solow, 1974) that “we ought to act as if the 
social rate of time preference were zero.”  Pigou (1920) stated that pure time preference 
implies that “our telescopic faculty is defective,” and Harrod (1948) said that “pure time 
preference is a polite expression for the conquest of reason by passion.” Koopmans expressed 
“an ethical preference for neutrality as between the welfare of different generations.” 
Moreover, the optimal growth trajectory with positive utility discounting in an economy with 
an initial endowment of a non-renewable resource is unsustainable in the sense that the optimal 
consumption trajectory is eventually declining (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Endress et al., 2005). 
Despite these advantages of intergenerational neutrality, the assumption has been challenged 
on technical, empirical and moral grounds.   
  The technical difficulty with a utility discount rate of zero is discussed for example by 
Heal (1993) and is sometimes referred to as the “cake-eating problem.”  In a simple cake-
                                            
1 This and the quotes in the first paragraph can be found in Arrow (1999, p. 14).   3
eating model of a finite resource, Heal (1993) shows that zero utility discounting in such an 
economy implies that any arbitrarily-small initial consumption level is dominated by a still 
lower initial consumption level. This gloomy prospect is not a logical conundrum – indeed a 
complete ordering of all consumption paths exists. It is rather the dismal consequence of 
contemplating an economy wherein consumption cannot be sustained. Advocating a positive 
discount rate in this case results in condemning all generations born beyond some future date to 
zero consumption – hardly consistent with intergenerational equity. 
  Olson and Bailey (1981) reject zero discounting on empirical grounds.  Using a partial 
equilibrium model with an exogenous positive interest rate, they argue that an individual rate 
of pure time preference equal to zero would impoverish the present.  People would reduce 
current consumption down to the subsistence level to provide for future generations.  Since 
people in fact do not choose subsistence in the present, the individual rate of pure time 
preference must be positive. A social welfare function without utility discounting would 
therefore seem to be in violation of the requirement that individual preferences must matter to 
the benevolent social planner.  
  Arrow (1999) and Dasgupta (2001) make a similar argument but emphasize the moral 
unacceptability of draconian savings in the first period. They show that in a Ramsey (1928) 
optimal growth framework with zero utility discounting and an elasticity of marginal “felicity” 
of consumption of 1.5 or less, the savings rate in generation one must be two thirds or more.
2  
This would appear to discriminate unfairly against the present generation and violate the moral 
principle of universalizability.
 3  There are two highly restrictive assumptions hidden in this 
                                            
2 For details of the calculation, see Dasgupta (2001), p. 255. 
3 Arrow cites the empirical studies in IPCC (1995) as justification. One difficulty in applying the universalizability 
criterion, however, is that the ethical grounds for the criterion, starting with Rabbi Hillel, derive from discussions   4
calculation, however. One is that said elasticity has been estimated from revealed preference. 
As Arrow et al. have later acknowledged, however, the relevant elasticity concerns the 
planner’s tolerance for intergenerational inequality, not that of an individual generation. The 
other problem is that intergenerational neutrality has been taken to imply zero utility 
discounting even within a generation, an assumption that we see below is unnecessary. 
 Intergenerational  equity,  and sustainability more generally, are inherently normative 
inquiries. Consumer impatience does not necessarily preclude a social planner from applying 
neutral weighting across generations as a matter of normative policy. But how can a social 
welfare function embody intergenerational neutrality and be simultaneously based on 
individual lifetime utilities and the personal rates of time preference that they embody? A way 
out of the dilemma can be found by following Burton (1993).  
  Burton shows that inter and intragenerational discount rates affect the optimal resource 
harvesting decisions in different ways. He observes that the standard approach in resource 
economics of maximizing a utilitarian welfare function implicitly assumes that inter and intra-
generational discount rates are equal thereby confounding the normative standard of 
intergenerational equity and the positive impatience of members of society within their own 
lifetimes.
4  Burton incorporates both considerations into models of optimal resource harvesting 
by postulating two separate discount rates: a personal discount rate, designated in the 
subsequent development by β , which reflects the rate of pure time-preference of individuals; 
and a generational discount rate, ρ, which addresses society’s degree of concern for 
                                                                                                                                          
of a finite number of individuals or income groups. As noted by Rawls (1971), they do not apply to the case of an 
infinite number of generations. 
4 Olson-Bailey (1981), Arrow (1999), and Dasgupta (2001) criticize zero utility discounting, albeit without 
recognizing this distinction.   5
intergenerational equity.
5 We apply this approach below in order to explore the consequences 
of intergenerational neutrality, i.e., ρ = 0. In order to engage the sustainable growth literature, 
we extend the basic model to allow both produced capital and renewable resources.
6 
  In summary, our objective is to extend the neoclassical approach to sustainable growth 
in order to distinguish between intragenerational impatience and intergenerational equity. We 
show that incorporating empirical information about intragenerational impatience into a model 
with intergenerational neutrality does not affect the golden rule level of aggregate consumption 
and that optimal trajectory of aggregate consumption is rising. This implies that a sustainability 
constraint, if imposed, would be non-binding in the model. We also show that sustainable 
income, defined as Green Net National Product (GNNP), is actually sustained along the 
optimal path, avoiding a paradox in the conventional approach. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we extend the neoclassical approach to 
sustainable growth to allow separate intragenerational and intergenerational discount rates. The 
social planner respects consumer sovereignty regarding lifetime utility, thus incorporating the 
individual’s personal rate of time preference via intragenerational discounting. The 
intergenerational discount rate is based on the planner’s preferences regarding 
intergenerational equity. In section 3, we consider the special case of intergenerational 
neutrality (ρ = 0). Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. General model and results 
                                            
5 Blanchard and Fisher (1989, ch 3) make similar distinction in developing the command optimum in a simple 
overlapping generations  (OLG) model in which each generation lives for two periods and the planner applies 
generation weighting. 
6 Burton’s objective was to analyze the consequences of distinguishing the two concepts of discounting for 
optimal resource extraction. For this purpose, he confined his analysis to cake-eating models of a constant-
population, resource-based economy.   6
  Burton (1993) examined implications of distinguishing intra and intergenerational 
discounting for optimal resource extraction in a cake-eating economy. In what follows, we use 
a similar distinction to examine issues relating to sustainable growth albeit in a production 
economy with renewable resources. This allows the planner to respect consumer sovereignty 
regarding impatience within a generation while simultaneously imposing different weighting 
between generations. We assume that the production function is  (,) YF K R = , where K is the 
stock of capital that depreciates at a constant rate, δ, and R is the extraction from a renewable 
natural resource stock, X, that grows at rate G(X), and is extracted at a constant unit cost, θ. 
  We assume that the economy is made up of overlapping generations of otherwise 
identical individuals.  In the simplest representation, each generation contains one individual 
who lives to age N.  At each time t, society is made of individuals who range in age from 0 to 
N, and no two individuals have the same age.  An individual of age τ is allotted consumption 
good in amount  () τ , t c  and enjoys utility  ( ) ( ) τ , t c u . We assume identical utility functions 
across individuals and time periods. 
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7 We replace Burton’s discrete-time formulation with continuous time to facilitate optimal control. Similarly, 
Burton’s discounting factors  α   and β  are replaced with 
ρ − e  and 
β − e .   7
Social welfare is then a weighted sum of the lifetime utilities of individual members of society, 
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Thus, the social planner’s problem is to choose consumption for each individual at each time 
() ,,  , ct t τ τ ∀  (a time path for each individual’s consumption) subject to the equations of 
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∫    (5) 
  This can be solved as an optimal control problem. Since the two equations of motion 
are describing rates of change in terms of pure time, t, application of the Maximum Principle to 
this problem would be greatly simplified by reformulating the objective function in terms of 
time, t, instead of the generational index, T. For this purpose, we switch from separability of 
social welfare by individual to separability by time period, following Burton’s welfare trade-
off analysis, involving both generational and personal discount factors (Burton (1993), p. 122-
125). We can then re-write the optimization problem (5) as: 
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where ) (t C  representing the aggregate level of output available for consumption at time t, and 
V representing aggregate utility. 
  This involves two steps. First, we provide the first order conditions from the 
maximization problem that determines V.  
  To solve for  ) (C V , form the Lagrangian: 
 £ () ()




uct e d Ct ct d
βρ τ τ τλ ττ
−− ⎡ ⎤
=+ − ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∫∫                (7) 
Inspection of the Lagrangian indicates that a necessary condition for maximization is that the 
weighted marginal utilities be equated, so that along the optimum consumption path, c*, is 
   () ()( ) ()
( ) ** ,, 0 , 0 uct uct e N
βρ τ ττ
− ′′ =≤ ≤     ( 8 )  
From equation (8), each generation’s share of aggregate consumption is determined by 
the difference between the intra and intergenerational discount rates. Suppose β>ρ, i.e., the 
personal discount rate is greater than the generational discount rate.  It then follows directly 
from equation (8) that  )) 0 , ( * ( ' )) , ( * ( ' t c u t c u > τ ,  i.e., that marginal utility is lower for younger 
individuals and  ) 0 , ( * ) , ( * t c t c < τ . That is, at any time t, a younger individual consumes a 
larger share of society’s aggregate consumption than an older one. On the other hand, if the 
intergenerational discount rate is higher than the intragenerational one (i.e., β<ρ), a younger 
individual will consume a smaller share of aggregate consumption. All generations share the 
same share when intra and intergenerational discount rates are equal (β=ρ).    9
Following the standard approach in neoclassical sustainable growth theory, we now 
assume that utility function is in the form of constant elasticity of marginal utility: i.e.,   
   1 , )] , ( [ )) , ( (
) 1 ( > − =
− − η τ τ
η t c t c u       ( 9 )  
Equation (9) then implies that at the optimum, 
  
** ( ) / (, ) (, 0 ) ct ct e
β ρτη τ
−− =        ( 1 0 )  
As shown in the Appendix, this functional specification permits the computation of the utility 
of aggregate consumption: 
   () () ,
1 − − − =
η AC C V                         (11) 
where A represents the “aggregation coefficient”, which depends on the parameters β, ρ, and η.  
A few observations are in order with respect to this result.  First, consider the effect on 
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This comparative static provides analytical validation of Burton’s (1993) remark that  
a higher personal discount rate results in lower marginal utility of aggregate consumption for 










       ( 1 5 )    10
Thus, an increase in the generational discount rate increases the marginal utility of society, i.e., 
i.e., aggregate consumption decreases. 
  We now form the current-value Hamiltonian for maximizing W: 
   () [(,) ] [() ] HV C F K R RC G X R λ θψ =+ − − + − .    (16) 
Application of the maximum principle yields the standard first order conditions, which can be 
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  Further development of equation (17) is especially revealing.  Computing derivatives 
and then forming the ratio  ' / ' ' V V  results in cancellation of the coefficient A.  The Ramsey 
condition can then be written in the standard way 
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Arbitrage conditions (18) and (19) show that even in this overlapping generations model, the 
optimum trajectory of aggregate consumption is governed at each time by the relationships 
among aggregate quantities and the generational discount rate, ρ, but not the personal discount 
rate, β. 
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Thus, if the optimal trajectory involves capital accumulation over time, then before reaching 
the steady-state, we have ) ( ρ δ + > k F  and, therefore,  0 > C & .  
 
3. The case of intergenerational neutrality 
  We believe that this finding has important implications for modeling economic growth 
in a manner compatible with intergenerational equity.  As suggested by the quotes in the 
introduction, stewardship for the future can be accommodated by setting the generational 
discount rate, ρ, equal to zero. The immediate problem with this approach is that the welfare 
maximand is infinite for any consumption path that does not converge to zero. This objection 
can be readily overcome, however, by transforming the objective function ala Koopmans 
(1965) as:  
()
0
ˆ    ,     (( ) ) ()
Ct
t
Max W W V C t V C dt
∞
=
⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ ∫      ( 2 1 )  
where C ˆ  is the bliss point as suggested by Koopmans.  
Now, the Hamiltonian becomes: 
ˆ (( ) ) () [(,) ] [() ] HV C tV C F K R R C G X R λθ ψ ⎡⎤ =− + − − + − ⎣⎦  (22) 
The Hamiltonian (22) is an autonomous control problem. Following Chiang (1992) (equations 
8.15 – 8.17), we have: 
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That is, sustainable income defined as the maximum value of social utility at any point in time 
is equal to the value of consumption and net investment, evaluated at the shadow prices of   12
produced and natural capital. The latter provides a definition of GNNP (see e.g. Weitzman, 
1976, 1997). That is GNNP is sustained forever. This avoids the conundrum in models with 
positive intergenerational discounting that optimal consumption and sustainable income are 
eventually declining (see also Endress et al., 2005). 
 
4. Conclusions 
We develop  a model of optimal and sustainable growth that accommodates distinct 
intragenerational and intergenerational discount rates. Under the assumption of constant 
elasticity of marginal utility, the optimum trajectory of aggregate consumption is governed at 
each time by the relationships among aggregate quantities and the generational discount rate 
but not the personal discount rate. As the personal discount rate increases, each generation 
allocates a higher share of its lifetime consumption to earlier stages of life. However, an 
increase in the personal discount rate does not affect the trajectory of aggregate consumption.  
We also show that the optimal consumption trajectory is continually rising, if the 
society is approaching golden rule from a stock of physical capital lower than the steady state 
quantity.  This implies that a sustainability constraint, if imposed, would be non-binding. We 
also show that sustainable income, defined as GNNP, is actually sustained along the optimal 
path, avoiding the paradox in the conventional approach. 
In the general case, without restrictions on the elasticity, we find that, at any time t, 
consumption shares of each generation depend on the difference between intra and 
intergenerational discount rate. If the intragenerational discount rate is greater than the 
generational discount rate, the younger generation consumes a larger share of aggregate 
income then the older ones at any point in time. On the other hand, if the intergeneration   13
discount rate is higher, a younger generation consumes a smaller share than the older ones. All 
generations have the same share if the intra and intergenerational discount rates are equal.  
For project evaluation of large investment projects such as climate-change mitigation, it 
may be informative to ask, to what extent intragenerational impatience would change such 
findings as in Stern Review (2006), even in the presence of intergenerational neutrality.  
Just as we have distinguished between the intra and inter-generational utility discount rates, 
one could further distinguish between the planner’s intergenerational inequality aversion and 
the intragenerational elasticity, η , as revealed by market transactions. We leave this 
exploration to further research.   14
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APPENDIX 
Utility of aggregate consumption in a model of overlapping generations. 
 
  Assume that individual utility of consumption has a functional form with constant 
elasticity of marginal utility: 
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Efficiency condition (9) can then be written: 
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It is easy to show that the expression ( 1)
bx bx e
− + attains a maximum of 1 for x = 0 and is 






. The desired result follows 
immediately from the chain rule, since  1
x
β
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∂
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